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Abstract
This paper proposes a reliable fault-tolerant model predictive control applied to drink-
ing water transport networks. After a fault has occurred, the predictive controller
should be redesigned to cope with the fault effect. Before starting to apply the fault-
tolerant control strategy, it should be evaluated whether the predictive controller will
be able to continue operating after the fault appearance. This is done by means of
a structural analysis to determine loss of controllability after the fault complemented
with feasibility analysis of the optimization problem related to the predictive controller
design, so as to consider the fault effect in actuator constraints. Moreover, by evalu-
ating the admissibility of the different actuator-fault configurations, critical actuators
regarding fault tolerance can be identified considering structural, feasibility, perfor-
mance and reliability analyses. On the other hand, the proposed approach allows a
degradation analysis of the system to be performed. As a result of these analyses, the
predictive controller design can be modified by adapting constraints such that the best
achievable performance with some pre-established level of reliability will be achieved.
The proposed approach is tested on the Barcelona drinking water transport network.
Keywords: Fault tolerance evaluation, model predictive control, actuator-fault
configurations, structural analysis, reliability, drinking water transport networks
1. Introduction
Potable water is provided to consumers and industry by means of drinking water
networks, which are large-scale systems that can be structurally organized in several
layers (Ocampo-Martinez et al., 2013):
• A supply layer, composed of water sources, large reservoirs and natural aquifers.
• A transportation layer, linking water treatment and desalination plants with reser-
voirs distributed all over a city.
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• A distribution layer, used to meet consumer demands and link reservoirs with
consumers.
This paper is focused on the transportation layer and, in particular, on drinking
water transport networks (DWTNs). These networks require sophisticated supervisory-
control strategies to ensure and maintain optimal performance even in faulty conditions.
In order to take advantage of these expensive infrastructures, also necessary is a highly
sophisticated real-time control (RTC) scheme to ensure optimal performance (Brdys &
Ulanicki, 1994; Ocampo-Martinez et al., 2013). The RTC scheme in a DWTN might be
local or global. When control is local, regulation devices only use measurements taken
at specific locations. While this control structure is applicable in many simple cases,
it may not be the most efficient option for large systems with a highly interconnected
and complex sensor and actuator infrastructure. A global control strategy, in contrast,
which computes control actions taking into account real-time measurements all through
the network, is likely the best way to use infrastructure capacity and all available sensor
information. Global RTC deals with the problem of generating control strategies (ahead
of time), based on a predictive dynamic model and telemetry readings of the network
to optimize operation (Ocampo-Martinez et al., 2013). The multi-variable and large-
scale nature of DWTNs have led to the use of some variants of model predictive control
(MPC) as a global control strategy (Pascual et al., 2013).
Global RTC of DWTNs needs to be operative even in faulty conditions. This prob-
lem calls for the use of fault-tolerant control (FTC) mechanisms after a fault is diag-
nosed so as to avoid the global RTC stopping every time a fault appears. FTC was
developed in order to address the growing demand for plant availability (Blanke et al.,
2016). The aim of FTC is to keep a plant fully operative by designing its control sys-
tem such that system performance can be kept close to desirable levels and stability
conditions can be maintained, not only when the system is in nominal conditions but
also in the presence of system component faults; FTC should, at the very least, en-
sure acceptable degraded performance (Noura et al., 2009). Tolerance against faults
can be embedded in MPC relatively easily in several different ways, as discussed in
Maciejowski (2002):
• Changing the constraints in order to represent the fault effect, with the algorithms
for actuator faults being especially easy to adapt.
• Modifying the internal plant model used by the MPC in order to reflect fault
influence on the plant.
• Relaxing the nominal control objectives in order to reflect system limitations
under faulty conditions.
Reviewing the literature, the inclusion of fault tolerance in MPC has already been
considered by several authors, including (Zhang & Jiang, 2008), who provides a de-
tailed review of the state-of-the-art in FTC. Camacho et al. (2010) provides a general
overview on how fault tolerance can be embedded in MPC. The inclusion of fault-
tolerance in MPC has mainly been addressed by considering practical strategies ac-
cording to the application domain. For example, Prodan et al. (2015) described a
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method for including fault tolerance in MPC for smart grids in order to ensure the
proper amount of energy in storage devices and reliable coverage of essential consumer
demand. Ocampo-Martinez & Puig (2009) applied fault tolerance in MPC to sewage
networks considering a hybrid systems framework. Yang & Maciejowski (2012) de-
signed a group of predictive controllers to compensate for the fault effects for each
component in a wind turbine. More theoretical aspects have also begun to be studied,
such as coupling with active fault diagnosis (Raimondo et al., 2013) and the use of set-
invariance theory (Yetendje et al., 2012). More recent additional objectives for MPC
controllers, proposed in Sanchez et al. (2015) and Salazar et al. (2015), have been to
preserve system health and reliability, respectively.
The research presented in this paper is based on three concepts:
• How fault accommodation/reconfiguration strategies were applied in a linear
quadratic regulator (LQR) (Staroswiecki & Berdjag, 2010).
• The idea that fault configurations should be evaluated before applying FTC strate-
gies (Staroswiecki et al., 2012).
• The idea of using reliability with the FTC design (Guenab et al., 2011).
Starting from these key ideas,we propose a new reliable fault-tolerant MPC scheme
for application to DWTNs. After a fault has occurred, the MPC controller should be
redesigned to cope with the fault by considering either a reconfiguration or an accom-
modation strategy, depending on knowledge available on the fault. Before starting to
apply the FTC strategy, whether the MPC controller will be able to continue operating
after the fault appears should be evaluated. This is done in two ways: first, a structural
analysis is done to determine the level of loss in post-fault controllability; second, a
feasibility analysis is done of the optimization problem related to the MPC design so
as to consider the fault effect on actuator constraints. By evaluating the admissibil-
ity of different actuator-fault configurations (AFCs), critical actuators regarding fault
tolerance can be identified considering structural, feasibility, performance and reliabil-
ity analyses. This has been studied in Robles et al. (2012), where only some of the
analyses proposed here were considered.
Our approach allows a degradation analysis of the system to be performed in terms
of performance and reliability. As a result of this analysis, the MPC controller design
can be modified, adapting the constraints so as to achieve the best achievable per-
formance with some pre-established level of reliability. The proposed approach was
tested in the Barcelona DWTN, in an application that also shows that relevant informa-
tion about critical actuators can be extracted by considering the different analyses we
propose.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of methodologies for the analysis
of the influence of faults taking into account reliability features. As discussed, some
of the proposed methodologies have been previously documented but not their appli-
cation in the considered fault tolerance framework, to the best of our knowledge, after
a thorough literature review (a secondary contribution of the paper).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. MPC controller design for
DTWNs to include fault tolerance is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
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proposed fault tolerance evaluation approach for the MPC controller after fault occur-
rence. Section 4 deeply describes the design of the MPC controller such as the relia-
bility can be preserved. The results of an application of this approach to the Barcelona
DWTN are provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes with some suggestions
for further research.
2. MPC of DWTN with fault-tolerant capabilities
2.1. Flow-based control-oriented model
This paper considers a general DWTN as represented by a digraph G(V, E) (see
Šiljak (1991) for more details), where a set of elements, i.e., ns sources, nx storage
elements, nq intersection nodes, and nd sinks, are represented by v ∈ V vertices con-
nected by a ∈ E links. Due to the network function, water is transported along the links
by nu flow actuators (i.e., pipes and valves), passing through reservoirs or tanks, from
specific origin locations to specific destination locations. The network is subject to sev-
eral capacity and operational constraints, and to measured stochastic flows to customer
sinks as driven by water demand.
Selecting the volume in storage elements as the state variable x ∈ Rnx , the flow
through the actuators as the manipulated inputs u ∈ Rnu , and the demanded flow as
additive measured disturbances d ∈ Rnd , the control-oriented model of the DWTN
may be described by the following set of linear (or linearized) discrete-time difference-
algebraic equations (DAE) for all time instants k ∈ N:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +Bddk, (1a)
0 = Euuk + Eddk, (1b)
where the difference equation in (1a) describes the dynamics of the storage tanks, and
the algebraic equation in (1b) describes static relations in the network (i.e., mass bal-
ance at junction nodes). Moreover, A, B, Bd, Eu and Ed are time-invariant matrices
of suitable dimensions as dictated by the network topology.
System (1) is subject to hard state and input polytopic constraints given by:
U , {u ∈ Rnu |umin ≤ u ≤ umax} , (2a)
X , {x ∈ Rnx |xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax} , (2b)
where umin, umax, xmin and xmax are the actuator and tank operational limits.
2.2. Statement of the control problem
The DWTN (1) is controlled using an MPC law that aims to minimize the opera-
tional costs of the DWTN as proposed in economic model predictive control (EMPC)
(Rawlings et al., 2012; Limon et al., 2014; Ellis et al., 2014). According to Blanke et al.
(2016), the solution of a control problem consists of finding a control law from a given
set of control laws U , such that the controlled system achieves the control objectivesO
while its behaviour satisfies a set of constraints C. Thus, the solution to the problem is
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completely defined by the triplet 〈O, C,U〉. In the case of an MPC, the triplet 〈O, C,U〉
is defined by
O : min
x˜,u˜
J(x˜, u˜), (3a)
subject to:
C : xi+1|k = Axi|k +Bui|k +Bddi|k, i ∈ [0, N − 1] ⊂ N, (3b)
0 = Euui|k + Eddi|k, i ∈ [0, N ] ⊂ N, (3c)
ui|k ∈ U, i ∈ [0, N − 1] ⊂ N, (3d)
xi|k ∈ X, i ∈ [0, N ] ⊂ N, (3e)
where
x˜ =
(
x1|k, . . . , xN |k
)
, (4a)
u˜ =
(
u0|k, u1|k, . . . , uN−1|k
)
, (4b)
d˜ =
(
d0|k, d1|k, . . . , dN−1|k
)
(4c)
are the state, input and disturbance sequences over N , respectively. N denotes the pre-
diction horizon used by the MPC controller. The sequence d˜ comes from a forecasting
module based on existing time-series techniques (see Pascual et al. (2013) and Wang
et al. (2015) for more details).
The MPC law belongs to the set U and is obtained using the receding horizon
philosophy (Maciejowski, 2002; Rawlings et al., 2012). This technique consists of
solving the optimization problem (3a) from the current time instant k to k + N using
x0|k as the initial condition obtained from measurements (or state estimation) at time
k. Only the first value u∗0|k from the optimal input sequence u˜
∗ (which arises from
the solution of the optimization problem (3a)) is applied to the system. At time k + 1,
in order to compute u∗0|k+1 the optimization problem (3a) is solved again from k + 1
to k + 1 + N (i.e., the time window is shifted), updating initial states x0|k+1 from
measurements (or state estimation) at time k + 1. The same procedure is repeated for
the following time instants.
The objective function J in (3a) collects all the control objectives of the closed-
loop system, taking the name multiobjective cost function. In general form, (3a) can be
written as:
J(x˜, u˜) =
nJ∑
i=0
N∑
k=0
Ji,k, (5)
where nJ is the number of objectives and Ji,k corresponds to the evaluation of each
particular objective i at time k. In the case of DWTNs, (5) typically includes the
following objectives (Ocampo-Martinez et al., 2013):
• Minimization of water production and transport costs. The main economic costs
associated with drinking-water production are treatment processes, water acqui-
sition and use costs and, most importantly, electricity costs, as delivering drink-
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ing water at appropriate pressure levels through the network implies significant
costs in booster pumping and elevation from underground storage. This objective
can be mathematically formulated as
Je,k , α>kWe uk, (6)
where αk , (α1 + α2,k) ∈ Rnu , which takes into account a fixed water-
production cost α1 ∈ Rnu and a time-varying water-pumping cost α2 ∈ Rnu
that changes in each time instant k according to the dynamic electricity tariff.
We allows the priority economic objective to be weighted in the objective func-
tion (5).
• Appropriate safety management of stored water. Water demand must be fulfilled
at all times. However, some risk prevention mechanisms need to be introduced in
tank management so that the stored volume is maintained above a certain safety
value for possible emergencies and to guarantee future water availability. This
objective can be mathematically formulated as:
Js,k , ξ>k Wsξk, (7)
which penalizes the volume falling below the threshold s by including the fol-
lowing soft constraint
xk ≥ s− ξk ≥ 0, ∀k, (8)
where s ∈ Rnx+ is a positive vector of base stocks (the minimum volume in each
tank to avoid stock-outs) and ξk ∈ Rnx+ is a vector of positive slack variables to
be minimized, representing the water volume allowed to fall below the desired
base stock level. Ws allows the priority economic objective to be weighted in
the objective function (5).
• Smoothing of control actions. Valves must also operate smoothly in order to
avoid major pressure transients in pressurized pipes, as this could result in dam-
age to pipes. The use of a smooth reference changes also helps the lower-level
regulator performance. Similarly, water flows requested from treatment plants
must have a smooth profile due to operational constraints. To ensure the smooth-
ing effect, control signal variation between consecutive time instants is penal-
ized. This objective can be mathematically formulated as:
J∆u,k , ∆u>kW∆u∆uk, (9)
which penalizes control signal variations ∆uk , uk − uk−1 so as to extend the
life of actuators and ensure smooth operation. W∆u allows the priority economic
objective to be weighted in the objective function (5).
2.3. Inclusion of fault-tolerant capabilities
The control problem 〈O, C,U〉 described in Section 2.2 will now be reformulated
to consider faults. If an active FTC strategy is considered, there are two main ways to
adapt the MPC law to introduce fault tolerance (Blanke et al., 2016):
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1. System reconfiguration. This consists of finding a new set of constraints Cf (Θf ),
where Θf is the set of parameters changed by the faults such that the control
problem 〈O, Cf (Θf ),Uf 〉 can be solved. This strategy can be applied when the
fault detection and isolation (FDI) module does not provide a fault estimation.
The faulty components are therefore unplugged by the supervisory system and
the control objectives are achieved using non-faulty components. In the case
of the actuators, this implies that the model (1) used by the MPC controller is
modified as follows:
xk+1 = Axk +
∑
i∈IN
Biuk,i +Bddk, (10)
0 =
∑
i∈IN
Eu,iuk,i + Eddk, (11)
where IN is the subset of non-faulty actuators.
2. Fault accommodation. This consists of solving the control problem 〈O,Cˆf (Θˆf ), Uˆf 〉,
where Cˆf (Θˆf ) is an estimate of current system constraints and parameters pro-
vided by the FDI module. This strategy can be applied when a change occurs in
either system structure or parameters. In this strategy, the control law is modified
while the remaining elements within the control loop are kept unchanged. In the
case of the actuators, this requires that the system model (1) used by the MPC
controller should be modified as follows:
xk+1 = Axk +
∑
i∈IN
Biuk,i +
∑
i∈IF
βi(uk,i, θi) +Bddk, (12)
0 =
∑
i∈IN
Eu,iuk,i +
∑
i∈IF
εi(uk,i, θi) + Eddk, (13)
where the functions βi and εi and the parameters θi should be estimated by the
FDI module for actuators belonging to the faulty actuator subset IF .
Note that, in changing the model (1) of the MPC controller using either of the two
previous strategies, the controller will consider the effect of the fault in the system
model when computing the control action u∗0|k. According to Maciejowski (2002), this
is different from other control laws (e.g., LQR, pole placement), where the control law
should be designed off-line for the considered set of faults, so as to produce a bank
of controllers that should be gain-scheduled on-line according to the fault features.
However, depending on how critical the fault is, the MPC controller will not be able to
compute a control input or else the computed control input will not lead to acceptable
performance. For this reason, when using an MPC controller the effect of the fault and
the admissibility of the obtained control input needs to be evaluated.
3. Actuator fault-tolerance evaluation
This section describes a series of analyses to assess the fault-tolerance capabili-
ties of the system after a fault has occurred and before applying a reconfiguration or
accommodation strategy to achieve fault tolerance.
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In case that a fault occurs, then:
• The system might have lost some of the properties required to proceed with sys-
tem control, or
• That system performance is degraded to an unacceptable level and it is not worth
continuing with system control by activating fault-tolerant strategies.
3.1. Admissibility analysis algorithms
Before starting to apply the FTC strategies described above, it should be evaluated
whether the MPC controller will be able to continue operating after fault occurrence.
This is done by means of a set of admissibility analysis algorithms, which are based on
a structural analysis to determine the loss of post-fault controllability, complemented
by a feasibility analysis of the optimization problem related to the MPC design so as
to consider the effect of the fault on actuator constraints. Moreover, by evaluating the
admissibility of the different AFCs, critical actuators regarding fault tolerance can be
identified considering structural, feasibility, performance and reliability analyses.
Let I be the set of system actuators. The different admissibility analysis algorithms
consider that the set of all subsets of system actuators is denoted by 2I . For each subset
K ⊆ I , corresponding to a given AFC, and using the reconfiguration (or accommoda-
tion) approach described in Section 2.3, the algorithms evaluate whether or not a given
system property, denoted by P (K), is satisfied (Blanke et al., 2016). Thus,
PK =
{
1 if the property is satisfied,
0 if the property is not satisfied. (14)
This evaluation induces the set of all subsets of I , 2I , to be partitioned in two
classes as follows:
2I+ = {K ⊆ I;PK = 1}, (15)
2I− = {K ⊂ I;PK = 0}. (16)
The class 2I+ contains all the subsets of the actuators for which PK is satisfied.
Thus, the admissibility analysis mainly aims to identify the following (see Figure 2):
• Critical actuators, i.e., the set of actuators that are required to satisfy PK . For
every analysis in Figure 1, a set of critical actuators will be identified.
• Redundant actuators, i.e., the actuators that are not critical for correct function-
ing of the system. These may be excluded as PK will continue to be satisfied.
• Redundancy degree, consisting of the number of extra non-critical actuators
through which PK could hold. There are two types of redundancy: weak (cor-
responding to the largest number of sequential faults that can be tolerated in the
best case scenario, i.e, while continuing to satisfy PK) and strong (correspond-
ing to the smallest number of sequential faults that can be tolerated in the worst
case scenario).
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Figure 1: Flow diagram of the proposed actuator fault-tolerance evaluation approach
The approach proposed here consists of a set of analyses based on both the graph
and the mathematical model of the system (see Figure 1):
• From the system graph, the structural analysis allows us to determine whether
or not the system with a given AFC is structurally controllable. It does this by
checking the existence of at least one path linking demands with sources. At this
stage, all possible paths linking demands and sources are also determined. Using
this information, the reliability of the AFC can also be evaluated.
• From the system mathematical model, a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP)
can be formulated that allows a feasibility analysis to be performed. This analysis
allows the physical capacity of the system to be checked considering constraints
in actuators and states (see (3a)). Moreover, as a complementary analysis, the
closed-loop performance based on a given global objective for the AFC can be
evaluated.
These two sets of analyses are complementary. When a reconfiguration strategy is
used, connectivity between demands and sources may be lost when the faulty actuator
is removed (see Section 2.3). This will affect both controllability and reliability. How-
ever, those properties do not take into account the physical limitations of the system
actuators. Hence, although connectivity is preserved, the MPC-related optimization
problem might lead to an unfeasible solution, due either to the lack of capacity of the
remaining actuators or the poor performance of the control loop. This happens when
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Figure 2: Critical and redundant actuators of the system
an accommodation strategy is used, since although the connectivity among elements is
preserved (the faulty actuator is not removed), the resulting MPC-related optimization
problem may be unfeasible or the closed-loop control scheme may perform poorly.
As a result of the application of the methodology presented in Figure 1, it is possible
to determine critical actuators as follows (type of analysis in brackets):
• Actuators that are essential to preserving demand-source connectivity (by means
of structural controllability analysis).
• Actuators that are indispensable to preserving the capacity to move the desired
water volume from sources to meet demands taking into account actuator physi-
cal constraints (by means of structural controllability analysis).
• Actuators whose malfunction generates high suboptimality of the considered
control objective if the system is maintained in operation after fault detection
(by means of performance analysis).
• Actuators whose malfunction does not guarantee reliable operation of the system
(by means of reliability analysis).
Figure 2 depicts the different types of critical actuators that can be identified ap-
plying the sequence of analyses presented in Figure 1. Results for each analysis are
considered in subsequent analyses, in such a way that actuators that are considered
critical at a given stage of the methodology might not be further considered in later
analyses.
3.2. Analyses based on the system graph
3.2.1. Structural analysis algorithm
The structural analysis algorithm copes with connectivity properties of the system
without considering the actual value of the model parameters or the limitations of the
actuators1. This test is used to evaluate the admissibility of a given AFC when the
reconfiguration FTC strategy is used, i.e., when an actuator is removed after fault oc-
currence and the system is controlled by the remaining actuators.
The algorithm starts by determining the digraph2 G(V, E) of the model used for
1See Blanke et al. (2016) for important definitions related to the topic.
2See Šiljak (1991) for details on how to obtain a digraph from the system model.
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Algorithm 1 Controllability analysis using the structural approach
1: Obtain the digraph G = (V, E) of the system model used for designing the MPC
(related to the optimization problem in (3a)) given a particular AFC
2: From the system digraph G = (V, E), find the reachability matrix Γ in (A.4)
3: for each xi ∈ Rnx , i = 1, ..., nx do
4: if @uj ∈ Rnu , j = 1, ..., nu | Γij = 1 then
5: AFC is non input-reachable
6: else
7: if s-rank([A B]) 6= n then
8: is non-structurally controllable
9: else
10: is structurally controllable
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
the MPC controller. Using the digraph, the structural controllability of the system for
a given AFC will be evaluated. If this property is preserved after the actuator fails,
the AFC is admissible, i.e., it is able to tolerate the fault; otherwise, the AFC is not
admissible. To evaluate structural controllability from the system graph, some basic
graph theory concepts (reviewed in the Appendix) will be used (see (Bondy & Murty,
1982) for more details). Using Theorems 1 and 2 from the Appendix, Algorithm 1 will
perform the structural controllability analysis for a given AFC.
3.3. Analyses based on the system mathematical model
3.3.1. Feasibility analysis algorithm
To evaluate the admissibility of the control of a given AFC when system constraints
(2) are considered, it is not possible to use the structural analysis algorithm3. presented
in Section 3.2.1.
Feasibility in an MPC controller design is a key property to be satisfied before
the control action can be computed by solving the optimization problem (3a) (Ma-
ciejowski, 2002). In this case, the admissibility evaluation problem for a given AFC
can be naturally handled as a CSP (see the Appendix for a definition). Consequently,
the feasibility evaluation of the MPC-related optimization problem (here for a given
AFC using the reconfiguration strategy)4 can be checked using Algorithm 2.
3.3.2. Performance analysis algorithm
The degradation of the control objective in a fault situation can be quantified by
means of maximal loss of efficiency ρ with respect to the objective function in a non-
3This would also be the case when an accommodation FTC strategy is used, since the actuator would not
be removed after the fault but would be operated under the remaining operating range estimated by the FDI
module.
4In case that an accommodation strategy is used, the faulty model used in Algorithm 2 should be replaced
by the one used in (12).
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Algorithm 2 Feasibility Analysis
1: for k = 1 to N do
2: Uk−1 ⇐ U
3: Xk ⇐ X
4: end for
5: W ⇐ {
x˜︷ ︸︸ ︷
x1, x2, . . . , xN ,
u˜︷ ︸︸ ︷
u1, u2, . . . , uN−1}
6: D ⇐ {X1,X2, . . . ,XN ,U1,U2, . . . ,UN−1}
7: Z ⇐

(
xk+1 = Axk +
∑
i∈IN
Biuk,i +Bddk, 0 = Euuk + Eddk
)N−1
k=0

8: HA = (W,D,Z)
9: if the CSPHA has solution then
10: AFC is admissible
11: else
12: AFC is non-admissible
13: end if
fault situation J0. This fact establishes whether of not the control objective degradation
after an actuator fault Jf is admissible. Thus, an AFC is admissible regarding perfor-
mance if the following condition is satisfied: Jf ≤ (1 + ρ) J0. This condition will
enable a performance analysis of the AFC considering the faulty actuator, with either
an accommodation or a reconfiguration strategy.
The procedure for evaluating the performance admissibility of the controller with
respect to the fault situation is summarized by Algorithm 2, modifying the constraints
defined in step 7 to add a new constraint:
φxN +
N−1∑
i=0
Φi(xi, ui) ≤ (1 + ρ) J0. (17)
Note that, as in the case of the feasibility analysis, the existence of a solution to the
CSP associated with MPC performance evaluation for a given AFC using the reconfig-
uration strategy5 can be proved by Algorithm 2 but including the new constraint (17),
which considers the admissibility condition with respect to control performance over
the prediction horizon N stated in the MPC controller.
4. MPC redesign to preserve reliability
4.1. Reliability analysis algorithm
Reliability is defined as the probability that a given component (or system) will
accomplish its intended function during a given period of time and in specific operating
5If an accommodation strategy is used, the fault model used in Algorithm 2 should be replaced by the
one used in (12).
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conditions and environments (Gertsbakh, 2000). In other words, it is the probability
of success in accomplishing a task or achieving a desired property in a process, based
on proper operation of components. The main advantages of including a reliability
analysis are as follows:
• Information on component health is integrated in controller design and improves
the life of the system components
• Reliability information on the system can be considered as design criteria to be
used in MPC implementation including FTC capabilities
• Essential actuators whose malfunction causes abrupt system reliability decay are
identified.
In the case of DWTNs, reliability is understood as the ability of the network to pro-
vide an efficient water supply to consumers under both normal and abnormal operating
conditions. For this reason, reliability is a measure of DWTN performance. Reliability
in DWTNs has already been considered in the literature (Torii & Lopez, 2012; Ostfeld,
2001).
When a reconfiguration FTC strategy is used, the reliability of DTWNs can be
affected due to the probabilities of success of each of the components in the new con-
figuration. For this case, the admissibility evaluation problem of a given AFC can be
handled as composite reliability of the subsystems in the system. In particular, since re-
liability in DTWNs is related to guaranteed supply to consumers, it can be determined
based on all the possible paths linking demands and sources from the network graph
already obtained in the structural analysis.
The global reliability of a system, denoted by Rg,k, generally consists of the de-
composition of its subsystems into elementary combinations of serial and parallel sub-
systems that can be extracted from the matrix containing all paths linking demands and
sources (Guenab et al., 2011):
• Reliability of np parallel subsystems is defined as:
Rp,k = 1−
np∏
i=1
(1−Ri,k), (18)
• Reliability of ns serial subsystems is defined as:
Rs,k =
ns∏
i=1
Ri,k, (19)
where Ri,k represents the reliability of the i-th actuator (or subsystem) at time k and
where λi,k is the failure rate modelled as an exponential distribution:
Ri,k = e
−λi,kk. (20)
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Thus, overall system reliability is given by:
Rg,k =
ns∏
i=1
(1−
np∏
i=1
(1−Ri,k)). (21)
Algorithm 3 shows the reliability evaluation of a given AFC based on computing
system reliability. Since the calculation of reliability for each and every AFC could
impose a great computational burden, to save time, the path matrix that contains all
the possible paths in the system graph (see Appendix) is used. This matrix has the
following structure:
p1 p2 p3 . . . pnph
u1 1 0 1 . . . 0
u2 0 1 1 . . . 1
u3 1 0 0 . . . 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
unu 0 1 1 . . . 1
(22)
where nph is the number of path and 1 and 0 indicate the presence and absence, re-
spectively, of an actuator in the path. Each time a component malfunctions, the row
assigned to that actuator is withdrawn along with all the paths that make use of it. To
evaluate fault tolerance for the rest of the system, the reliability index Rg,k should be
greater than a specific admissibility threshold Rth at a given time horizon kend, both
defined by the user.
Algorithm 3 Reliability analysis
1: Decompose the system in np parallel subsystems and ns subsystems using the
system graph.
2: for i = 1 to nu do
3: Evaluate actuator reliability Ri,k using (20).
4: end for
5: for g = 1 to np do
6: Evaluate reliability of parallel subsystems Rp,k using (21) and (18).
7: end for
8: for g = 1 to ns do
9: Evaluate reliability of system Rg,k using (21) and the result obtained from the
evaluation in (18).
10: end for
4.2. MPC redesign to preserve reliability
When a fault occurs, the MPC law is modified to cope with the fault, as discussed
in Section 2.3. As explained in Guenab et al. (2011), the value of the actuator failure
rate changes because the control action should be increased in order to compensate
for the fault effect. In this case, energy consumption increases and the value of the
failure rate also increases due to the actuator load increment. Thus, there is an interplay
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between maintaining closed-loop performance and reliability. To maintain the desired
performance, the relationship between the actuator load increment and reliability can
be established. One of the most commonly used relationships is based on assuming
that the actuator failure rate changes with the load through the following exponential
law:
λi,k = λ
o
i e
βiui,k (23)
where λoi represents the baseline failure rate (nominal failure rate) and ui is the control
action for the i-th actuator. Parameter βi is a fixed factor that depends on the actuator
characteristics. Thus, the reliability of the actuator can be expressed in terms of its load
as follows:
Ri,k = e
λik = eλ
o
i e
βiui,kk. (24)
Consider that a predefined reliability threshold Rth should be maintained until the end
of the system mission at time kend. This threshold defines the minimal acceptable
reliability value in the degraded fault mode. The aim is to translate this threshold to a
load threshold that can be applied to the actuator. This actuator load threshold can be
derived from (24) as follows:
|ui,th| = 1
βi
ln
(
lnRi,th
λoi kend
)
. (25)
Hence, the MPC controller (3a) can be redesigned by including the following constraint
in the i-th actuator control:
ui ∈ [−ui,th, ui,th] (26)
However, as discussed in Weber et al. (2012), this will only preserve the reliability
of the i-th actuator. In order to preserve the reliability of the whole DWTN, the new
actuator constraints (26) should be derived taking into account the reliability expression
(21) and the reliability thresholdRth at the end of the MPC prediction horizonN . This
can be achieved by formulating a CSP problem, such as that reflected in Algorithm 4,
which considers, as constraints, the reliability of the DWTN in (21) derived by means
of Algorithm 3 in terms of the reliability of each actuator, the impact of actuator load
(see (24)) and the actuator operational constraints defined in (3a).
After solving the CSP problem in Algorithm 4, to solve the optimization problem
associated the MPC problem, the resulting updated actuator constraints are used instead
of the actuator operational constraints defined in (3a). In this way, we can guarantee
that the MPC controller computes a control sequence that preserves reliability. There
is, of course, a trade-off between reliability and performance. Increasing the reliability
thresholdRth will imply a reduction in the DWTN performance but will extend the life
of the remaining actuators.
5. Application to the Barcelona DWTN
5.1. Case study description
The Barcelona DWTN is used as the case study of this paper. This network is man-
aged by Aguas de Barcelona SA (AGBAR), which supplies drinking water to Barce-
lona and its metropolitan area. The main water sources are the rivers Ter and Llobregat.
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Algorithm 4 MPC redesign to preserve reliability
1: for k = 1 to N do
2: Uk−1 ⇐ U
3: end for
4: W ⇐ {
u˜︷ ︸︸ ︷
u1, u2, . . . , uN−1}
5: D ⇐ {U1,U2, . . . ,UN−1}
6: Z ⇐
{(
Rg,k = f(Ri,k), Ri,k = e
λoi e
βi|ui|k, i = 1, . . . , nu
)N−1
k=0
, Rg,N−1 > Rth
}
7: HA = (W,D,Z)
8: {U1,U2, . . . ,UN−1} ⇐ solve(HA)
Currently, there are four water treatment plants: the Abrera and Sant Joan Despí plants,
which extract water from the Llobregat river; the Cardedeu plant, which extracts water
from the Ter river; and the Besòs plant, which treats underground water from the Besòs
river aquifer. There are also several underground sources (wells) that can provide water
through pumping.
For this case study, ten sources were considered, consisting of seven underground
and three surface sources, which currently provide an inflow of about 12 m3/s. The Bar-
celona DWTN is comprised of 63 tanks and 130 actuators distributed across 46 valves
and 84 pumps6. Figure 3, which shows the general topology of the network, depicts a
complex system in terms of its elements and the relationships and connections among
them. Figure 4 shows the graph derived from this network; the nodes correspond to
reservoirs or pipe merging/splitting nodes and the arcs correspond to actuators (valves
and pumps). Five of the pumps are used to draw water from underground sources and
the remaining pumps satisfy water demand at appropriate pressure levels. The network
has 88 main water consumption sectors (for further information regarding the Barce-
lona DWTN, see (Pascual et al., 2013)). Both the demand episode and the calibration
set-up of the network are as established by AGBAR. The AGBAR control centre has a
telecontrol system for network management. The Barcelona DWTN also has some 98
remote stations, which manage about 450 elements in real time, including flow meters,
pumps, valves and chlorine dosing instruments.
The system control objective set for the MPC controller is to minimize operational
costs (water transport and production for the entire network) while satisfying water
demand for each consumption sector (Pascual et al., 2013). Thus, recapping on Section
2, the financial objective in (6) can be written as follows:
Jk =
N−1∑
i=0
[α1 + α2,k]uk, (27)
6For our purposes we refer to pumps, although, in fact, pumping stations would be more correct, as the
stations consist of arrays of pumps with a given local control/coordination strategy regarding certain outflow
requirements.
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Figure 3: Barcelona Drinking Water Transport Network
17
Figure 4: Graph of the Barcelona DWTN
which takes into account the water cost α1 (price of water at source) and the electricity
cost α2,k (operation of pumps and valves). Note that the time variance of α2 is due to
the fact that pumping costs vary according to the time of day. The prediction horizon
N is 24 hours. No terminal cost is considered in this application.
Demands are imposed as equality constraints in the model (1) used by the MPC
controller, which, in the case of the DWTN, can be expressed in discrete-time state-
space form (1) using a sampling time Ts = 1 hour. x ∈ X ⊆ Rnx is the state vector
corresponding to the water volumes of the nx = 63 tanks, u ∈ U ⊆ Rnu represents
the vector of manipulated flows through the nu = 130 actuators (pumps and valves)
and d ∈ D ⊆ Rp corresponds to the vector of the p = 88 water demands (consumption
sectors).
There are 16 nodes in the Barcelona DWTN and since demand can be forecasted,
these are assumed to be known. Thus, d is a known vector of non-negative elements
that contains the measured disturbances (demands) affecting the system.
5.2. Results
Several tests and analyses were performed for the Barcelona DWTN case study
to illustrate the proposed methodology. Figure 1 shows the sequence of tests applied.
In this section, all the capabilities of each analysis are explored, while Section 5.3
describes only the ones necessary for this study. The results were obtained using a 1.5
GHz and 2.00 Gb RAM Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo PC . Matlab c© and Tomlab were used
to perform the simulations.
The structural analysis was carried out using the computed reachability matrix and
path computation, which, as expected, produced equivalent results. However, each
technique yielded several additional results that provided important information con-
cerning to the operation and behaviour of the DWTN. From the reachability analysis,
we could determine which states were structurally controllable, while the path compu-
tation analysis obtained all possible paths from a source to a destination node as well
as, for each path, an approximate operational cost (according to the electricity cost of
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each element) and a maximal water flow (according to the physical constraints of the
actuators). In this stage, critical actuators were located and different approaches were
used according to the applied strategy. Although a fault scenario with a faulty actuator
at each time instant was considered in both cases, the representation of the malfunction
was denoted in different ways. In the reachability analysis, the malfunction was de-
termined from the state-space matrices (a zero value was forced in the position where
a connection value previously existed between the state and the actuator failure). In
path computation, all paths with the faulty component were extracted from the path
matrix (22). From this study, the critical actuators for each state and for the whole net-
work could be identified. Note that although the results obtained by both techniques in
the structural analysis were similar, the computation time required for the reachability-
matrix-based strategy was much higher, at almost 200 times the time consumed by the
path computation technique (579 s vs. 3 s).
The feasibility analysis can only be implemented if the previous analysis is first
made, since its implementation is based on the path matrix calculation. The result
of this analysis was a set of paths that guaranteed that demand was satisfied, taking
into account the physical constraints of the network actuators. The cost of maintaining
correct network operations was also obtained in this stage. The time consumed by this
analysis was 1.57 s.
Performance was computed using the objective function (27) and the actuator con-
straints. The analyses were performed taking into account faulty components and
comparing the corresponding performance with the fully operative case (non-faulty
system). The computation time needed for this analysis was 8 s. Finally, the relia-
bility analysis showed the level of reliability of each component and path and of the
whole network. AFCs were analysed by extracting all paths using the faulty actuator
and re-computing the reliability of the DWTN. Two rankings were computed: the first
one according to demand satisfaction, showing which demands were more likely to be
unsatisfied; and the second one according to the most critical actuators, showing how
the reliability of the entire network decreased if those actuators were damaged. The
computation time in this case was 5 s.
5.3. Discussion
Although each of the previous analyses can individually provide a great deal of
information about the fault tolerance of a network, linking them up reduces the compu-
tational burden. In order to clearly present and easily discuss the proposed methodolo-
gies, a smaller portion of the Barcelona DWTN (see Figure 5) was used for illustrative
purposes.
The first test consisted of locating the critical network actuators by means of a
structural analysis. These critical actuators are those without which (outage) path con-
nectivity is lost. The results of this analysis, summarized in Tables 1 and 2, point to an
important number of critical actuators within the network, due to the topology and the
way of connecting network elements, as most actuators (valves or pumps) are the only
link between tanks and demands. Therefore, if an actuator fails, then the correspond-
ing demand will not be satisfied. Note that the information shown in Tables 1 and 2 is
particularly significant for AGBAR (the manager of the water infrastructure), since it
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Figure 5: Portion of the DWTN related to Demand 56
Table 1: Structural Critical Actuators (towards tanks)
No. Name No. Name No. Name No. Name
122 iAltures 15 iCanGuey2 62 iGuinardera1 30 iPapiol1
10 iBegues1 14 iCanGuey3 60 iGuinardera2 88 iSJD10
6 iBegues2 21 iCanRoig 101 iLaSentiu 7 iStBoi
2 iBegues3 57 iCanRuti 34 iMasGuimbau1 9 iStCliment1
1 iBegues4 37 iCarmel 31 iMasGuimbau2 5 iStCliment2
32 iBellsoleig 43 iCerdMontflorit 100 iMasJove 40 iStGenis1
61 iBonavista 42 iCerdUAB 68 iMntjcStaAmalia 38 iStGenis2
20 iCanGuell1 12 iCesalpina1 69 iMntjcTresPins 13 iStaClmCervello
17 iCanGuell2d3 11 iCesalpina2 3 iOrioles 45 iStaMaMontcada
16 iCanGuell2d5 82 iCornella100 23 iPalleja1 35 iTibidabo
18 iCanGuey1d2 39 iFlorMaig 24 iPalleja2 56 iTorreBaro1
19 iCanGuey1d5 109 iFnestrelles300 27 vPalleja70 65 iTorreoCastell
44 iVallensana1 8 iViladecans1 4 iViladecans2 25 vAbrera
54 vCerdanyola90 63 vMontigala 90 vSJD 59 vTerStaColoma
104 vSJDTot 58 vTer
identifies the critical elements in the network for surveillance/correction policies to be
implemented in the event of element damage (fault).
Applying the first test to the network, as depicted in Figure 5, four possible paths
were detected. These were:
Path 1: AportT → u58→ u50→ u52→ u54→ u43→ d56
Path 2: AportT → u58→ u51→ u52→ u54→ u43→ d56
Path 3: AportT → u58→ u55→ u54→ u43→ d56
Path 4: aPousB → u53→ u52→ u54→ u43→ d56
Analysing the structure of the network, as depicted in Figure 5, it can be observed
that it contains two critical actuators: 54 and 43. If either of these actuators fail, then
Demand 56 will not be satisfied. All the remaining actuators can be considered as
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Table 2: Structural Critical Actuators (towards demands)
No. Name No. Name No. Name No. Name
115 vPallejaATLL 116 iPalleja3 117 iMasGuimbau3 118 iVallvidrera
119 vHorta 120 iUAB 121 iVallensana2 122 iBoscVilaro
123 iTorreBaro2 124 iCerdSabadell 125 vBesosStaColoma 126 v117Montigala
127 v70CFE 128 v55BAR 129 iMontemar 130 vAltures
redundant actuators.
The second analysis done to the Barcelona DWTN was to identify the actuators
whose physical constraints limit water transport capacity through a certain path. Note
that this analysis did not consider any fault in those actuators. The analysis, performed
using Algorithm 2, also pinpointed several alternative paths through which water trans-
port is possible (or even mandatory) given the constraints of the paths for supplying
demands.
Results for this last analysis considering the whole DWTN identified other criti-
cal actuators: 26, 52 and 91 (namely iPalleja4, vBesosMontCerd and vGava100a80,
respectively, in Figure 3). Note that the increase in the number of critical actuators,
taking into account their physical constraints, is not significant. For the network in
Figure 5, actuator 52 is not a critical element according to the structural controllability
property, meaning that connectivity is not lost when this component fails. However, the
feasibility analysis determined that this actuator was in fact critical when the actuator
physical constraints were considered. Actuator 52 cooperates with a flow of water to
satisfy the demand that cannot be satisfied with a flow through a single path.
The third analysis identified the optimal paths to reach a selected destination node
without considering the system constraints, i.e., the structural optimal paths. This
analysis was performed using the structural algorithm, as explained in Section 3.2.1.
For the smaller network the cost of each path was computed, corresponding to the
electricity cost of the actuators for both paths and the cost of water treatment in a
determined source. For paths 1, 2 and 3, the cost was 0.54 e.u.7, while for path 4 the
cost was 0.77 e.u. This small example would indicate that any of the first three paths is
optimal for satisfying Demand 56.
A criterion to decide which of the three paths is optimal for this demand is to
calculate the maximum flow of water for each path, which can also be computed in
this analysis and is given by the smallest value of the maximum flow of water of the
actuators in a given path. In this case, since all paths were restricted to 0.3 m3/s, due
to the physical capacities of actuator 43, any of the first three paths are recommended.
However, if actuator 43 were not considered, path 1 would be the optimal path as it
has a maximum flow of 2.2 m3/s, while in the other paths, actuator 55 is restricted to
0.35 m3/s, and actuators 51 and 52 to 0.8 m3/s.
The fourth analysis consisted of identifying the set of optimal paths including the
7Note that costs are given in economic units (e.u.) rather than real units (e) for confidentiality reasons.
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Table 3: Entire DWTN Performance Analysis
Actuator No. Faulty cost [e.u.] Cost overrun [%]
41 514.44 2.43
47 515.94 2.73
74 528.05 5.14
78 557.62 11.03
86 515.08 2.55
89 556.22 10.74
97 510.49 1.64
102 539.87 7.49
103 552.21 9.95
objective function (27) and the system constraints (2a)-(2b). Path details are not pro-
vided here, but the total costs of maintaining the whole DTWN in proper working order
and satisfying all its demands was 502.25 e.u. In the case of the network depicted in
Figure 5, the optimal path obtained from the fourth analysis was path 4. Although it
may appear that, when only Demand 56 is considered without the interconnection of
the entire network, the other paths are less costly when the entire network is considered,
this is not true. The actuators used in path 4 are also used to satisfy other demands, so
sharing components results in an optimal solution.
The fifth test was performance analysis, taking into account the critical actuators
already identified in the previous tests, with the difference in costs showing the im-
pact that a single faulty actuator could have on an entire network. Results from this
analysis are summarized in Table 3. Note that all comparisons took into account an
optimal functioning cost (under non-faulty conditions) of 502.25 e.u. Moreover, fault
cost denotes the functioning cost under faulty conditions.
According to the analysis of the entire DWTN, some actuators did not have a sig-
nificant impact on the total performing cost (e.g., actuators 28, 29, 33, 64, 71, 80, 81,
85, 87, 94, 107, 108, 113). However, other actuators (such as 78 or 89) significantly
increased cost, taking into account daily estimates. These latter actuators are shown
in Table 3. Degradation in costs obtained with this analysis can be the foundation for
the introduction of redundant actuators in the network or an alternative fault tolerance
strategy. For the network depicted in Figure 5, the performance analysis shows that
the cost of maintaining operations for the network with a fault in any of these actuators
does not increase the cost.
The accommodation and reconfiguration strategies presented in Section 2.3 are
now illustrated for the case of a fault in actuator 108 (named vTerMontcada), which
according to the previous analysis, is redundant. First the reconfiguration strategy is
illustrated. Figure 6 presents the volume behaviour of tank 33, which is supplied by
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Figure 6: Volume evolution of Tank 33 with MPC using Reconfiguration
two actuators: 73 (iCornella130) and 108 (vTerMontcada). It can be seen that in a
non-faulty situation, the volume of this tank presents a repetitive pattern (filling when
pumping is cheaper and emptying otherwise) to satisfy the water demand. However,
when a fault occurs (at k = 50 hours), if the MPC controller is not reconfigured (la-
belled as fault occurrence in the plots), tank 73 volume drops to zero at k = 58 hours
and demand is not satisfied anymore (unfeasible solution). However, if the MPC con-
troller is reconfigured by removing the faulty actuator 108 from the control model, the
tank level is still able to supply the required demand. However, the tank volume de-
creases with time, indicating that the faulty actuator should be repaired. Figures 7 and
8, which depict the behaviour of actuators 108 and 73, show that actuator 73 starts to
deliver more flow in an effort to compensate for the faulty actuator 108 that is removed.
Figures 9, 10 and 11 depict tank 33 volume and actuator 108 and 73 flows when
the fault is accommodated by the MPC controller. The fault affecting actuator 108
reduces the operating range by 50%. In this case, the faulty actuator is not removed
from the control model of the MPC controller; rather, the operating limits of actuator
108 are updated according to the new operating range. Figure 9 shows how the volume
behaviour of tank 33 in a non-fault situation and when using accommodation looks
exactly the same; in contrast, when the controller is not accommodated, the volume
tends to zero and demand is not satisfied.
From Figures 10 and 11, it can be seen that the MPC controller compensates for the
reduction in the faulty actuator’s operating range by increasing use of the non-faulty
actuator, thereby compensating for the impact of the fault.
Although the proposed algorithm improves handling of the behaviour of the tank
volume and actuator flows, it has computational and financial costs, as implementation
of this feature increments computation time by 30 s (12%) and the cost overrun by
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Figure 7: Water flow in Actuator 108 with MPC using Reconfiguration
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Figure 8: Water flow in Actuator 73 with MPC using Reconfiguration
around 9%.
The reliability analysis also takes into account the results of the previous analysis.
The reliability of the entire network considering proper operation is 90.74% success-
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Figure 9: Evolution of volume in Tank 33 with MPC using Accommodation
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Figure 10: Water flow in Actuator 108 with MPC using Accommodation
ful in satisfying the desired property when the reliability of each component is calcu-
lated using (20) with λ = 0.0034 (data obtained Ministry of Work and Social Affairs
(2008)). The association between demand satisfaction and reduced reliability when a
faulty component exists is shown in Table 4.
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Figure 11: Water flow in Actuator 73 with MPC using Accommodation
As can be seen in Table 4, although most faults in actuators do not significantly
affect reliability in satisfying demand, some completely override the satisfaction of
the desired property. These actuators are critical actuators regarding reliability. The
risk of having a malfunction in the system can be better understood when we compute
the reliability of the entire network. Examples of critical actuators obtained from this
study were actuators 102 and 103 since their malfunction led to a drop of 31.13% in
the reliability of the entire network.
The reliability analysis was applied to the network depicted in Figure 5. The reli-
ability of satisfying Demand 56 decreased to 1.33% if actuators 52 and 58 had a fault,
highlighting the importance of both these actuators for the operation of this smaller
network, and decreased to 0% when actuators 43 and 54 were faulty, reaffirming the
fact that these two actuators are critical. Otherwise, reliability remained the same. Re-
garding the entire DWTN, actuator 52 decreased reliability of satisfying the demands
in the network by 21.71%, denoting again that it is an important element in system
interconnectivity.
Critical actuators 43 and 54, when they malfunction, reduced the reliability of the
entire system towards zero; in contrast, the fact that other actuators did not affect reli-
ability denote them to be redundant actuators.
Finally, the MPC redesign approach to preserve the network reliability has been
applied to the entire DWTN using Algorithm 4. Figure 12 shows how the reliability of
the network evolves in time when this algorithm is used. It can be observed that with
the use of Algorithm 4, the reliability of the network degrades slowly compared to the
case that the reliability is not considered in the MPC design.
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Table 4: Association between demand satisfaction and reliability
Demand Percentage of Faulty Rpg in Faulty
No. total demand [%] Components conditions [%]
69 9.1 128 0
83 4.0069 82, 88, 90, 104 0
70 3.2537 125 0
70 3.2537 58 99.33
70 3.2537 53, 50, 51 99.99
33 1.964 108 99.98
58 1.9407 52, 58 99.33
56 1.6777 52, 58 98.67
64 1.4941 58, 59 0
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Figure 12: MPC redesign to preserve reliability
27
6. Conclusions
This paper has proposed a reliable fault-tolerant model predictive control strategy
for drinking water transport networks. The proposed approach combines structural,
feasibility, performance and reliability analyses. After a fault, the predictive controller
is redesigned to cope with the fault by considering either a reconfiguration or an ac-
commodation strategy depending on available knowledge regarding the fault. Before
starting to apply the fault-tolerant control strategy, whether the predictive controller
will be able to continue operating after the fault appearance needs to be evaluated.
This evaluation is performed by means of a structural analysis to determine post-fault
loss of controllability, complemented with a feasibility analysis of the optimization
problem related to the predictive control design, so as to consider the fault impact on
actuator constraints. By evaluating the admissibility of different actuator-fault config-
urations, critical actuators regarding fault tolerance can be identified. The proposed
approach also allows for a degradation analysis of the system in terms of performance
and reliability. As a result of this analysis, the predictive controller design can be mod-
ified by adapting constraints such that the best achievable performance with some pre-
established level of reliability is achieved. The proposed approach, successfully tested
on the Barcelona water network, shows that relevant information can be extracted about
critical actuators considered in the different analyses. Future research will investigate
the impact of uncertainty on the analyses and on the design of the predictive controller
including fault-tolerant capabilities.
Appendix
A. Graph reachability analysis
Definition A.1 (Path). Given a graphG = (V, E), a collection of vertices v1, v2, . . . , vk,
together with the edges (v1, v2), (v2, v3), . . . , (vk−1, vk) placed in sequence, then the
ordered set (v1, v2), (v2, v3), . . . , (vk−1, vk) is a path from v1 to vk.
Then, it is said that vi is reachable from vj if there is a path from vj to vi.
Definition A.2 (Reachable set of a vertex). A reachable set Vi(vj) of a vertex vj is a
set Vi of vertices vi reachable from the vertex vj ∈ V .
Definition A.3 (Reachable set of a vertices set). A reachable set Vi(Vj) is the set of
vertices vi that are reachable from at least one vertex vj ∈ V j .
Notice that Vi(Vj) is the union of the sets Vi(vj) for all vj ∈ Vj .
Definition A.4 (Input reachable system). A system with a digraph G(V, E), where V
is the union of the set of states X and the set of inputs U , is input reachable if the set
of states X is a reachable set of the set of inputs U .
From Definition A.4 it follows that if no input uj can reach a state xi, either directly
or through other states/inputs of the system, then there is no way of changing the system
in order to satisfy the desired control objectives.
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In order to establish the input reachability of the system with digraph G = (V, E),
the reachability matrix Γ = (Γij), defined as
Γij =
{
1 if vi is reachable from vj ,
0 otherwise, (A.1)
must be computed. According to Šiljak (1991), a straightforward way to determine the
reachability matrix Γ is through the following expression:
Γij =
{
0 if qij = 0,
1 if qij 6= 0, (A.2)
where Q = (qij) = Ξ + Ξ2 + . . .+ Ξs and Ξ is the interconnection matrix, defined as
Ξ =
 A B 00 0 0
C 0 0
 , (A.3)
and the submatrices A,B,C are Boolean representations of the original system matri-
ces A,B,C in state space.
Using (A.1), the reachability matrix is written as
Γ =
 F E 00 0 0
H θ 0
 . (A.4)
For the detailed procedure to determine the reachability matrix (A.4), i.e., the bi-
nary matrices F , E, H and θ, the reader is referred to Šiljak (1991). Additionally, the
following theorems should be recalled.
Theorem 1 (Šiljak (1991)). A system given by (1) is input reachable if and only if
computing the reachability matrix (A.4), the binary matrix E has no zero rows, and it
is output reachable if and only if the binary matrix H has no zero columns.
Theorem 2 (Šiljak (1991)). A system given by (1) is structurally controllable if and
only if it is input reachable according to Theorem 1 and the structural rank8 equals to
nx, i.e., s-rank([A B]) = nx.
B. Constraint satisfaction problem
A constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) on sets can be formulated as a 3-tuple
H = (W,D,Z) (Jaulin et al., 2001), where
• W = {w1, . . . , wn} is a finite set of variables;
8The structural rank of a matrix is the maximum rank of all numerical matrices with the same non-zero
pattern. It can be easily computed in MATLAB using the srank command.
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• D = {D1, . . . ,Dn} is the set of their domains (where, in this paper,Di ⊆ R, i =
1, . . . , n);
• Z = {z1, . . . , zn} is a finite set of constraints relating variables ofW .
A point solution of H is a n-tuple denoted by (w˜1, . . . , w˜n) ∈ D such that all con-
straints Z are satisfied. The set of all point solutions of H is denoted by SH. This set
is called the global solution set. The variable wi ∈ W is consistent inH if and only if
∀w˜i ∈ Di ∃ (w˜1 ∈,D1 . . . , w˜n ∈ Dn) |(w˜1, . . . , w˜n) ∈ SH,
with i = 1...n. The solution of a CSP is said to be globally consistent, if and only
if every variable is consistent considering the whole set of constraints. A variable is
locally consistent if and only if it is consistent with respect to a group of constraints.
Thus, the solution of a CSP is said to be locally consistent if all variables are locally
consistent.
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